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Household-level panel data from a nationally representative sample of rural Indian households describing the
adoption and profitability of high-yielding seed varieties (HYVs) associated with the Green Revolution are
used to test the implications of a model incorporating learning-by-doing and learning spillovers. The
estimates indicate that: (i) imperfect knowledge about the management of the new seeds was a significant
barrier to adoption; (ii) this barrier diminished as farmer experience with the new technologies increased; (iii)
own experience and neighbors' experience with HYV significantly increased HYV profitability; (iv) farmers
do not fully incorporate the village returns to learning in making adoption decisions2
I. Introduction
That individuals learn from their peers, neighbors or friends is an important public policy assumption
that underpins, for example, public subsidies of schooling and has been hypothesized to be a significant
source of economic growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1993). Quantitative evidence on the importance of learning
externalities, however, is not extensive. While there are studies reporting associations between the behaviors
of individuals and their neighbors, these may be wholly spurious in that they may be driven by common
unobservables (Case, 1991; Evans et al, 1992), or they may reflect, if real, peer influences that do not entail
learning. The principal feature that distinguishes external effects that are due to learning from those due to
mere mimicking or social pressure is that an individual's productivity, not just his/her behavior, is affected by
his/her neighbor's behavior.
Just as the most appropriate test of learning by doing requires the measurement of changes in
productivity, or the rewards to productivity, that accrue from experience (see, e.g., Bahk and Gort, 1993), the
identification of learning from neighbors also requires information on productivity or its rewards in addition
to measures of neighbors' characteristics or behavior relevant to productivity growth. It is not sufficient,
however, to find that an individual's productivity is affected by a neighbor's behavior to confirm the existence
of  learning from neighbors. It is possible, for example, that social pressure - by which neighbors collectively
induce an individual to behave in some way - can improve that individual's productivity without any learning
on the part of the individual. To test for knowledge spillovers and learning externalities requires a more
precise specification of the learning mechanisms and of the production technology.
In this paper, we incorporate learning by doing and learning from others in a modified target-input
model of new technology (Wilson, 1975; Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1994). We use the model to establish and
carry out tests for individual and external learning effects based on panel data describing farmer behavior and
profitability at the onset of the "green revolution" period in India. This time period, when new agricultural
technologies were first imported into India, is particularly useful for examination of hypotheses concerning3
learning - while farmers had been, prior to the introduction of new seeds, using essentially the same
technology for decades, new opportunities for greater productivity arose at least in some areas of the country
for the first time. 
The modeling approach we take, which emphasizes the problem of deciphering the optimal
management of a new technology, contrasts with the recent work by Besley and Case (1993, 1994) on
learning spillovers in agriculture. In their model, estimated using data from one village in India, the
technology adoption problem is one in which the profitability of adoption is uncertain and exogenous;
farmers thus learn from experience about true profitability. In target-input models what is unknown and
stochastic is the best use of inputs under the new technology. There are two reasons we adopt this alternative
approach. First, optimal input use appears empirically to be central to farmers' concerns in environments
subject to technological change and there appears to be some suggestive but direct evidence of learning about
the best use of inputs from others. Table 1 reports the results from questions posed to farmers in green
revolution areas, taken from three surveys carried out in two countries, on farmers' sources of information on
fertilizer input use (two surveys), and on agricultural practices, the latter for farmers using new seed varieties.
In the Indian surveys, it is interesting to note that the only questions on information were about input use -
there were none on the profitability of seeds. In all of these surveys, neighbors appear to be important sources
of information about input use, as important as formal public information-dissemination sources.
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A second reason we adopt the target-input model is that, in contrast to models with uncertain but
exogenous profits, the profitability of any new technology grows over time as knowledge accumulates. It is
thus possible to test directly for learning externalities in terms of productivity, rather than by inference from
farmer adoption behavior. Moreover, while it is not necessary to assume away the additional exogenous
stochastic elements to new technology profitability that are emphasized in Besley and Case's framework in
estimating the consequences for profitability of learning about optimal practices, doing so provides testable
implications for farmer adoption behavior that are otherwise difficult to derive. In particular, we are able to4
derive tests of whether neighbor and own experience are perfect substitutes and whether there is efficient
learning.
In section II, we set out the basic model, deriving implications for the effects of own and neighbors'
experience with new technologies on profitability and on the scale of the new technology used. In section III
the data are described and the estimation procedures discussed. Section IV presents the estimates of the profit
functions and adoption decision rules. Evidence is first presented of the existence of spurious correlation of
neighbor behavior and individual profitability in the cross-section, which is evidently eliminated using the
estimation procedures employed subsequently. The profit function estimates show that new-technology
profitability increases significantly with increases in both own and neighbor new-technology experience in
ways consistent with the learning model - the returns to experience of both types diminish rapidly over time
and at the same pace. The estimates of the adoption decision equations also are consistent with learning from
neighbors, but reject a model in which the learning externalities are completely internalized. Section V
presents dynamic simulations based on the estimates and calibrated from the data which show the effects of
differences in farm wealth (scale) of farmers and their neighbors on the pace and magnitude of new-
technology adoption and on profits. These show that the estimates predict the well-know adoption "S" curve
that has characterized new technology adoption in agricultural environments (Feder et al, 1985) and that, as a
result of learning spillovers and non-exclusion, a poor farmer with richer neighbors will benefit more from the
introduction of new varieties than will a poor farmer with similarly poor neighbors.  Section VI contains
concluding remarks.
II. Theory
To establish a framework providing empirically implementable tests of the presence of learning from
others in terms of both productivity and behavior we use a modified version of the target-input model, which
has been used to study information acquisition and its effects on the productivity of innovations (see, e.g.,





deciding on input decisions each year know the technology of production up to a random "target" for input
use that has both a systematic and an idiosyncratic component, (ii) payoffs are decreasing in the square of the
distance between actual input use and the target, and (iii) ex post each individual can observe what the target
had been in each year and thus draw inferences about the systematic component of the target.
This model is particularly suitable for the study of Indian agriculture at the onset of the green
revolution, when the newly-available technology was in the form of high-yielding variety (HYV) rice and
wheat seeds. A well known feature of HYVs is that yields are sensitive to modern inputs such as chemical
fertilizer and pesticides as well as traditional inputs such as water. Both over- and under use of these inputs
can reduce yields, with the optimal level of use being influenced by region- and year-specific variables such
as the quality of the soil, temperature, and the level of rainfall and groundwater.  Because there is regional
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variation in optimal input use, country-wide guidelines may be of limited value compared with local
experience in raising yields. Finally, traditional varieties are generally less sensitive to the use of these inputs
and, because farmers have substantial experience with these varieties, additional experience with these crops
is unlikely to affect yields.
 We modify the basic model to make it more applicable to the Indian agricultural context. In
particular, in addition to incorporating the possibility of leaning from the experience of neighboring farmers,
the (i) the scale of operation is endogenous and importantly influences the precision of new information, (ii)
farmers can use two technologies, traditional and new, simultaneously, and (iii) farmers can engage in
strategic behavior.  To measure scale and to capture variation in the suitability of land to HYVs, we divide up
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the farmer's land into parcels of arbitrary size (e.g., acres, hectares, decimals).  The production technology
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and information restrictions are as follows: optimal or target input use on each parcel of land i planted using




















where 2  is the mean optimal use and u  is an i.i.d. normal random variable with variance F  . We consider
* 2
ijt u
below the implications of contemporaneous spatial correlations in the target shocks. Farmers are assumed to
know F  and have priors over 2  that are  . Yield per parcel using traditional varieties is 0  but u a
2*
yield per parcel using HYVs varies according to the suitability of land to HYVs and to input use. The (per




where 2  denotes actual input use and 0  reflects the loss associated with using less suitable land as more ijt ha
HYV is used.
a. Learning and Profit Growth  
It is easy to show that under the assumptions of the model expected profits at time t are a function of 
the farmer's posterior distribution for 2  at time t: j
*
where E(, )=0, µ captures variation among farmers in the overall productivity of their land, and F t pjt j 2jt
2
represents the variance of farmer j’s posterior distribution over 2  at time t. j
*5 6
At the end of the harvest the set of true or ex post optimal input levels,  , for each of the farmer's
parcels in that year becomes known.  The farmer can use this information to update his priors with regard to
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the expected optimal input use, 2 . When the shocks are independent across space, the variance associated
*
with this signal is F /H  . Thus, the precision of the signal, H /F , increases proportionately with the number uj t j t u
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of parcels on which the farmer plants new technology seeds. If the parcel-specific  s on land planted with
the new technology seeds by the farmer's neighbors are also revealed to the farmer, then the signal precision
























the possibility that information from neighboring farmers is more noisy than that from own cultivated area,
we assume that for each parcel of neighbors' land cultivated with the new seeds, what is revealed is
,where the variance of neighbors' noise, F  , is also known. >
28
Given the stationarity in the distribution of the  s, the time of information is irrelevant.   Assuming
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that farmer j has n neighbors, we may therefore use Bayesian updating to write 
where D=1/F  is the precision of the farmer's initial priors, D =1/F  is the precision of the information 20o u
2  2
obtained from each parcel planted by j on his own farm, S  is the cumulative number of parcels planted by jt
farmer j up to time t, and D =n/(F +F ) is the precision of the information obtained from an increase in  , vu k
22
the average of the cumulative experience of neighboring farmers.
There are three important restrictions on the profit effects of experience implied by this learning
technology. First, increases in the cumulative number of the parcels planted in HYVs by farmer j up to time t
and in the cumulative HYV-parcels of j's neighbors raise the profitability of j's high-yielding varieties at time
t. To see this, substitute (4) into the profit equation (3). This yields a conditional (on HYV use) profit



























Second, as seen from (5) and (6), the ratio of the profitability effects of cumulative experience - measured in
HYV-area - of farmer j and of farmer j's neighbors on farmer j's HYV profitability is a time-invariant
constant, D /D .  Finally, assuming non-zero use of HYVs , the per hectare returns to both own and neighbors’ vo
experience diminish over time, and at the same rate: 
So far, we have assumed that the information is perfectly correlated within parcels and perfectly
uncorrelated across parcels, so that the precision of the information is proportional to the number of parcels.
Similar implications of Bayesian learning arise even if there is a village-level shock to the optimal target in
each year. Assuming that the year-specific common-shock variance is F , the variance of farmer j’s posterior v
2
distribution at time t is then
which reduces to equation (4) when F =0. We show in Appendix A that the predictions of positive and v
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declining experience effects and the constancy of the ratio of own and neighbor experience effects are
identical to those arising in the i.i.d. case, but in this case in terms of the year-specific marginal additions to
experience rather than cumulative experience.
These implications of the learning-by-doing model with neighbor effects can be tested through
estimation of the profit function conditional on HYV use. Estimates of this function provide direct evidence






















experience, D .  Note that if the only source of uncertainty were imperfect knowledge about the profitability v
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of HYVs as in Besley and Case (1994), learning would not affect the growth of profits conditional on HYV
use. However, in that case, shocks to profitability influence the adoption decision. This has implications for
the appropriate method for estimating the profit function, as discussed below. 
b. Learning and Technology Adoption
In addition to affecting the structure of the profit function, the existence of learning by doing and
learning from neighbors' experience with respect to input use also has implications for adoption, i.e., the
choice of the scale of H . In particular, if each farmer wishes to maximize expected discounted profits where jt
* is the discount factor, then the (unconditional) problem faced by farmer j at time t is
where S  is the vector of experience for other farmers in j's village, and therefore we may write  -jt
As is evident in equations (9) and (10) the decisions made by each farmer depend on the past planting
decisions of neighboring farmers and his expectations about planting decisions in the future. Therefore, those
neighbor characteristics that predict their future planting decisions will enter into the decision rules of every
farmer. For example, a farmer whose neighbors have characteristics that make it likely that they will
experiment with HYVs may tend to curtail his own experimentation. This is because he can realize a higher
short-term return from planting the traditional variety and then shifting to the HYV when there is sufficient
experience from his neighbors to make adoption directly profitable.
To capture the influence of neighbor characteristics on farmer adoption and to obtain more precise

















particular, we make use of the solution concept of a Markov perfect equilibrium.   This solution concept
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implies that choices of farmer j as well as his neighbors at time t depend only on the experience and asset
variables and that, conditional on these variables, choices of H  and H  constitute a Nash equilibrium in each jt -jt
period.
The following first-order condition characterizes the internal-solution choice of the number of parcels
H  planted with the new seeds at time t by farmer j, conditional on the time-t choices of his neighbors and the jt
state variables (farm size and own and neighbors' experiences): 
Expression (11) indicates that the marginal contribution to profits of the last parcel planted with HYV seeds
in any period t is optimally negative. Farmers will always use more than the within-period profit-maximizing
amount of the new technology. This is because of the future profit gains that accrue due to learning by doing.
Formal solution of this problem requires backward induction from the final period T.
Analytic solutions for the HYV-decision rule cannot easily be derived for t<T. However, given a value
function at time t+1 and the restrictions imposed by Markov perfection, equation (11) for a farmer and his n
neighbors can be solved to obtain decision rules of the form
Insight into the nature of decisions made prior to period T may be gained through the examination of 
partial derivatives of the HYV decision rules at time T-1 with respect to the state variables evaluated at the
symmetric equilibrium (e.g., A=A, S =S, H =H). The expressions, which are complex, are contained in j jt t jt t
Appendix B. However, the effects of neighbors' assets on a farmer's adoption decisions permit discrimination
















neighbors' assets on any farmer's adoption decision, (ii) if a social planner decides on the planting decisions
for all farmers, or learning externalities are otherwise internalized, the effect of neighbors' average assets on
the amount of area planted to HYV by any farmer with n neighbors should be n times the effect of his own
assets and both effects should be positive, and (iii) if, as is assumed in the model, information externalities
are not internalized the effects of neighbors' assets that predict future plantings of HYV on a farmer's
adoption of HYV can be negative, although the own effects must remain positive. 
The negative effect of neighbors' characteristics on adoption will depend on whether the returns to
experience are increasing or decreasing. Consider a village made up of two farmers. An  increase in a farmer's
assets increases adoption in period T and thus increases the returns to experience in that period. Thus, given
the amount of HYV planted by farmer A, an increase in the assets of his neighbor, B, will increase B's HYV
area in period T-1. An increase in HYV use by B in period T-1 increases the precision of information
available to A in period T. How this increase in precision for the behavior of farmer A affects the adoption
decision depends on the sign of  , on whether the returns to experience for him in period T are
increasing or decreasing in experience.  If they are increasing (decreasing), then this increased precision will
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increase (decrease) the HYV planted by A in T-1. Thus if B's assets increase and there are decreasing returns
to experience, A is given an increased incentive to free-ride on his neighbors' learning by decreasing his own
learning. This incentive results in a negative effect of B's wealth on HYV use by A. By contrast, a positive
effect of B's wealth will result if there are increasing returns to experience. 
The model also yields implications for the relative magnitudes of the own and neighbors' experience
effects that are testable. First, if own and neighbors' experience contain the same amount of information
(D =nD ) then a further restriction on behavior is implied: voMHjT&1








That is, the relative effect of neighbors' and own experience on the amount of HYV chosen in each period is
constant across all periods and is identical to their relative contribution to profits, as in (5) and (6). If
information is transmitted imperfectly (F >0) then the relative magnitudes of the effects depend again on k
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whether the value function in period T exhibits increasing or decreasing returns to experience. In particular, if
the returns to experience are decreasing then 
with the inequality reversed if the returns to experience are increasing. The reason that own and neighbors'
experience can have different effects in the decision rule than they have in the profit function is that the value
function for farmer j depends on the precision of his own information as well as the precision of his
neighbors' information while the profit function depends only the precision of his own information. In the
presence of imperfect information, experience by j will increase the precision of j's information more than it
will increase the precision of his neighbors' information while an increase in neighbors' experience will have
the opposite effect. If information is transmitted perfectly then these two measures of precision coincide and
thus equation (13) holds.
III. Data and Empirical Implementation
a. Data
The data that we use are from a panel data set from India, the National Council of Applied Economic
research (NCAER) Additional Rural Incomes Survey (ARIS), that describes rural households from a national
probability survey begun in the crop year 1968-69, soon after the onset of the Indian green revolution when
new HYV-seeds first became available. The panel data set provides longitudinal information for 4,118
households pertaining to the crop years 1968-69, 1969-70 and 1970-71 on the area planted with the new13
high-yielding seed varieties (for wheat and rice), schooling, farm profits, and asset stocks and additions. An
important feature of these data is that the 250 villages in which the households reside are identified. It is thus
possible to construct village-level aggregates, based on sampling weights, that are representative of village
inhabitants and that have sufficient variation to test hypotheses about the influence of neighbors'
characteristics and behavior. Both the extensive coverage and the longitudinal feature of the data set, as
discussed below, are important for identifying cross-household learning effects.
Approximately two-thirds of the households interviewed in 1970-71, those in which the household
head had remained the same up through 1981, were resurveyed by NCAER in 1981-82 (the Rural Economic
and Demography Survey). While the data from this more recent panel round do not provide information on
the use of  HYV seeds, or more relevant to that period, on the vintages of the seeds used, information is
provided on the assets inherited by the household heads prior to the 1968 round of the survey.  This
information will be used to construct instruments, as described below, for use with the earlier panel data set.
The ARIS data show that farmers' adoption of HYVs was rapid and occurred at an accelerated rate
over the initial three-year period - among farmers in villages in which at least one farmer cultivated with HYV
seeds by 1970, only 19% were using HYV seeds in 1968, 29% had used the new seeds by 1969 while 42%
had used them by 1970.  Among the farmers using HYV seeds in the 1970-71 crop year, HYV acreage had
13
also increased at an accelerated pace - rising from only 4% of their cultivated acreage in the 1968-69 crop
year and 3% of their acreage in the crop year 1969-70 to over 20% of their acreage in 1970-71.  
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b. Specification of the Profit Function
The specification of the conditional profit function is obtained by substituting (4) into (3). We also
incorporate the possibility that a farmer's schooling may also improve productivity of the new technologies, in
accord with the hypothesis of T.W. Schultz (1983) that schooling is particularly useful in decoding
























where ,  is the stochastic shock reflecting, among other things, the differences between the realized optimal pjt
s and actual input choices 2 . ijt
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We use two different approaches to estimate equation (15). First, we estimate a linear approximation
to the HYV profitability term in (15) and use this approximation to test the broad implications of the model.
Then, we take the exact specification of the profit function in the model entirely seriously in order to obtain
structural estimates of the parameters. The linear approximation may be written:
where 0 N and 0 N are coefficients on H  and A , respectively and, to first order, $ =D /(D+(D +D )S) and ha o i t i t o t o o v t
$ = D /(D+(D +D )S) for some S that is representative of average experience at time t. The information vt v o v t t
coefficients, $  and $ , for own and village experience, respectively, embody the implications of the model - ot vt
they thus should fall over time because experience is cumulative and, from (5) and (6), the ratio 
is a time-specific constant, 8 . pt
We have specified the profit function (2), and its representation (15), to include a fixed effect µ. j
Because there is no asset accumulation in the model, the fixed effect does not influence the HYV decision net
of assets.  With assets endogenous, investment decisions and HYV choices are influenced by the unmeasured
fixed-effect and equation (16) cannot be estimated using OLS applied to cross-sectional data. For example,










tend to accumulate more assets inclusive of land. This gives them a greater incentive to gain experience with
HYVs since the returns to HYVs are increasing in land (equation (15)) and will thus affect their and their
neighbors' HYV use (equation (12)). This will lead to a positive and spurious relationship between own
profits and own and neighbors' prior HYV use.
We can exploit the panel characteristic of the data to both discern if there are spurious relationships
and to correct them. Differencing (16) over two points in time yields 
which removes the fixed effect. Note that there are now four coefficients associated with the experience
variables in the differenced form of (16) because the model implies that both the experience coefficients and
the variables vary over time. In particular, the experience coefficients, which reflect the profitability of
additional experience, diminish while experience increases over time.
In the context of the model, OLS estimation of (18) would yield unbiased coefficients, as the
compound error terms associated with the differences in the period-specific discrepancies between the choices
of 2 and their realizations   cannot be correlated with any of the right-hand-side variables, given the
independence of input-target shocks across time - H  is chosen prior to any knowledge about the  s. It is jt
possible, however, that the differenced profit shocks (), ) may be correlated with the differenced HYV area pjt
measures. First, if some component of the shock is known prior to planting then there will be a
contemporaneous correlation between profit shocks and planting decisions. Second, lagged profit shocks may
affect contemporaneous HYV use. For example, if the returns to HYV, net of the optimal input and observed
weather shocks, are uncertain, as in Besley and Case (1993, 1994), lagged profit shocks affect profit
expectations and therefore contemporaneous adoption.  This problem may be addressed using instrumental
16
variables applied to (18) - IV fixed-effects. Given the removal of the fixed-effect, the inheritance data may)Hjt . "ot%1Sjt%1%"vt%1¯ S&jt%1&"otSjt&"vt¯ S&jt%(t)t%(ao)Ajt%(av)¯ A&jt%),hjt
16
(19)
serve as instruments and, if all of the shocks are independently distributed over time, decisions made before
the resolution of the ,  such as )A  and H may serve as instruments as well. pjt jt-1 jt-1 
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In addition to using standard IV fixed-effects methods to estimate equation (16), we implement a 
constrained fixed-effects approach that imposes and tests the equality of coefficient ratios for the experience
variables (equation 17). Finally, non-linear IV fixed-effects methods are used to directly estimate the
structural parameters of equation (15) by differencing over time and then using a standard non-linear IV
procedure. 
c. HYV cultivation
Estimation of the HYV decision rule proceeds in essentially the same way as that for the linear
approximation to the profit function. In particular, the analog to equation (18) is thus
which includes information on village-average HYV-experience and asset changes in addition to own-
experience and asset changes. Because the HYV decision rule is likely to have a time-specific component
(e.g., given learning, HYV decisions will depend on the horizon over which the farmer is discounting) a linear
time trend belongs in the linear level equation and thus )t appears in equation (19). Note that because we
have not actually solved out for the decision rule, we cannot obtain measures of structural parameters using
the decision rule estimates as in the case of the profit function. However, as noted, the magnitudes and signs
of the estimated coefficients can be used to distinguish autarchy  (neighbors' experience should not influence
adoption, so that the " =0), whether own and neighbors' experience are equivalent (the relative effects of own v
and neighbors's experience are the same over time and as in the profit function), and whether there is strategic
behavior in the form of  free-rider effects (neighbors' assets decrease own use so that ( <0).  av
IV. Results 
a. Profit Function Estimates and Spurious Village Effects17
  To obtain the estimates of the conditional profit function (equation (15)), we differenced the last two
rounds of the three rounds of data for all farmers cultivating with HYV seeds in both of those rounds and
applied instrumental-variables estimation.  The own HYV-experience variables include lagged cumulative
18
HYV use by year for each farmer, measured in hectares, based on information from the first two rounds of the
survey. The neighbor HYV-experience variables include the lagged, round-specific cumulative sum of
hectares cultivated under HYV averaged (using sample weights) over all sampled farmers in each village,
whether or not they used HYV in any period, excluding the respondent farmer.  We use as measures of the
19
potential scale of operation, A , variables that would be expected to augment the intensity of cultivation. jt
These include the values of farm equipment, farm animals, and farm irrigation assets, which varied across
rounds. Land owned and schooling did not change between rounds for any farmers and thus do not appear in
the differenced equation.
As a specification test and a check on the ability of the differencing and instrumental estimation
procedures to eliminate (and not cause) any spurious correlation of village (minus respondent) and individual
variables, we first estimated the profit function for farmers not planting HYV seeds, using only the third-
round cross-sectional data. For such farmers, the prior HYV acreage and experience of their neighbors using
HYV seeds should be irrelevant to profitability, based on traditional cultivation, whatever the true model
underlying the transfer of knowledge of new technologies.  If, however, high-profit areas are also areas in
which farmers tend (not) to adopt HYV seeds, then it is possible to find a purely spurious positive (negative)
correlation between past HYV use among village neighbor farmers and the profitability of non-HYV-using
farmers. Table 2 reports in the first column the cross-sectional estimates of the profit function based on the
sample o f traditional-technology farmers. The positive and (marginally) significant coefficient for the
village-level HYV-experience variable suggests the importance of area-specific unobservables - farmers who
are not using HYV seeds apparently benefit from having neighbors with HYV experience.  And, indeed,
consistent with this result being entirely spurious, use of the fixed effects procedure eliminates the association18
between the village-level variable and farmer-specific profits - in the second column, estimates of the
differenced profit function (fixed effects) are presented, on the same sample of farmers, but also excluding
any who had cultivated with HYV seeds in the second year. With the fixed effect removed, the relationship
between neighbor HYV experience and the profitability of traditional seeds is no longer positive nor
significant. Finally, columns three and four report estimates using the FE-IV procedure based on the same
sample as in column two, the last column including as well the prior-period experience variable suggested by
the model. The use of instruments, while affecting the coefficients on the asset variables, do not substantially
affect the estimated coefficient for the village-experience variable estimated using fixed effects alone.
The results in Table 2 suggest that, based on the FE-IV estimates, there is no positive relationship
between the profits of traditional farmers and the experience of their neighbors with the new-technology
seeds. If there is learning from neighbors, such experience should be relevant, however, for farmers using the
new seeds. The HYV-conditional profit estimates (equation (15)) for the sample of farmers using HYV seeds
are presented in Table 3. In the first-column estimates, which assume that there are no village-level effects of
experience,  there is evidence of learning by doing - both the $  and $  coefficients, which reflect the effect ot ot-1
of the farmer's own experience with HYVs on the current return to HYV cultivation, are positive and
statistically significant.  Moreover, as predicted by the model, the returns to experience diminish over time.
The average area under HYV cultivation for an HYV-using farmer in the second period was .12 hectares; the
coefficient for own experience in period 2 ($ ) of .754 thus implies that a doubling of experience (from .1 to ot-1
.2 hectares) in that period would result in a 905 rupee or 21% increase in mean profits. The coefficient for
period 3 is substantially smaller as predicted by the model; however, the fact that by the third year the
average cumulative area already cultivated under HYV was .12 hectares and average HYV area cultivated  in
the third year was .43 hectares, implies that a doubling of HYV experience in the third period would increase
profits by approximately the same magnitude (938 rupees or 22%). 
The estimates from the specification allowing for both own- and village-level experience effects are19
reported in column two of Table 3. The estimated effects on HYV profitability from increases in the
experience of the village farmers, controlling for own experience and the fixed effect, are consistent with the
hypothesis of learning from others - these, like the own experience effects, are positive and significant and
diminish over time. The own estimates suggest that a doubling of own experience in each of these periods
results in a 39% and 36% increase in profits, respectively. Interestingly, the village experience effects on
HYV profitability are similar in magnitude to the own effects, with the ratio of the two coefficients (and thus
an indirect estimate of D /D ) being 1.2 and 1.8 for periods 2 and 3, respectively.  Thus either households vo
make use of information from only a couple of neighbors (n is small) or if the experience of many neighbors
is used by a farmer, the value of experience on others' farms is considerably less than the value of own
experience.
Inclusion of the neighbor experience variables  increased the size of the estimated effect of own-
experience in both periods 2 and 3 compared with the first-column estimates.  This suggests that, net of
individual (and therefore village) fixed effects, own and village experience are negatively correlated. This
result is consistent with the notion that certain characteristics may have opposite effects on own and
neighbor's usage, a result that will be readily apparent below. 
An important implication of the learning model is that, although the relative contributions to new-
technology profitability of own and neighbors' experience may differ in each period, the diminution in the
profitability of HYVs from additional experience should be the same for own and neighbor's experience. A
test of this hypothesis (which is non-linear in the estimated coefficients) was carried out and not rejected
(p=.11). To obtain a more precise estimate of the decline in the returns to experience we thus estimated a
third model that imposes this constraint. The non-linear constrained estimates are presented in column 3.
These provide a direct estimate of the 8  ratio in (17) for both own and neighbors' experience across the pt
second and third years. The point estimate is 4.33, suggesting that the effects of experience with the new
technology on the profitability of the new technology fell rapidly over time as more experience was acquired. 20
The other coefficients for the first three models are broadly similar across specifications; we focus
attention on the statistically and theoretically-preferred third-column estimates. The coefficients measuring
the profitability of HYV seeds relative to traditional seeds, although they are not precisely measured in the
third specification, suggest that such seeds were not profitable for a totally inexperienced farmer with no
experienced neighbors. The point estimate of 0 N, which measures the relative profitability of HYVs for an h
uneducated person with no experience, suggests that for each additional .1 hectares of HYVs planted in the
first period there would be a loss in profits of 344 rupees (14% of average profits for uneducated farmers in
that period). The positive value of 0  indicates that inexperienced educated farmers would lose considerably he
less--only 46 Rupees. 
The other model coefficients appear to be reasonable. The effects of equipment and animals on
profitability are positive, with the former being strongly significant. The negative (but insignificant in the
preferred specification) effect of irrigation assets is surprising, but it is worth noting that the average of the
asset coefficients, which  measures the average effect of an addition rupee of  asset stocks on annual profits,
is .80, which is significantly different from zero (p=.03).
Given that the linear models yield conclusions that are broadly consistent with the specific structure
of the profit function that was assumed in section 1, we used non-linear IV fixed-effects to estimate the exact
specification of the profit function (15). The structural estimates of the precision of the farmers' priors on
input use in the initial new-technology period, D, the precision of the information obtained from an additional
acre of own and neighbors' cultivation of HYVs, D  and D , and the effect on profits from using less-suitable ov
land, 0 , are presented in the last column of Table 3. The estimates, as expected,  indicate that own ha
experience, neighbors' experience, and better initial priors increase the precision of knowledge about the
appropriate choice of the target input 2 and thus increase profitability. The estimate of D  indicates that each o
additional hectare of own experience results in an increase in precision of .00129. The ratio  D /D =2.7 vo
measures the relative precision of information from own and neighbors' experience, which is only slightly21
larger than the figure obtained from the linear approximation estimates, although in this case the village-level
effect is not precisely measured. Similarly, the ratio D/D =.23 measures the precision of the farmers' initial o
priors relative to the precision of each hectare planted and suggests that the precision of the priors held by the
farmers prior to any experience with the new seeds was equivalent to what could be gained by planting .23
hectares of HYV. This is less than the average amount of information gained from own and neighbors'
experience in the first year (.37 hectares).
20
b. Determinants of HYV Use
The FE-IV estimates of the HYV-conditional profit function indicate that there is both learning by
doing and learning from what others do. Estimates of the HYV decision rule (12) indicate whether own and
neighbors' experience and predicted experience influence HYV adoption in a way that is consistent with the
learning model. These are presented in Table 4. The estimates in the first column, based on a specification in
which village-level experience effects are excluded, indicate that, consistent with the model and controlling
for the fixed effect, farmers having more prior experience with HYV seeds tend to use more of the new seeds
in the current period. The point estimates, which are statistically significant, suggest that in year 2, an
increase in prior experience from .1 hectares of HYV cultivation to .2 would have resulted in a .08 hectare
(68.5%) increase in HYV use in that period. The effect in year 3 is larger, with the same increase in
experience resulting in a .098 hectare increase, although the higher average HYV use in that period means
that the percentage increase would be smaller (22.6%). The fact that the experience effect on the use of HYV
does not fall over time, even though the contemporaneous profitability effects of experience diminish over
time, is not surprising: unlike in the case of the HYV-conditional profit function, the model does not yield
clear predictions about how experience effects on adoption will change over time. Experience effects on
adoption may increase over time, for example, if the effects of experience on the cost of learning (i.e., the cost
of planting more HYV than would be dictated by equating the marginal profitability of HYV and traditional
crops) dominate those arising from the diminishing returns to experience given adoption.22
The inclusion of the neighbor experience and asset variables, reported in column two of Table 4,
results in a reduction in the coefficients on own experience, although these effects are still positive and
significant. Although neither village-level experience coefficient is precisely measured, both effects are
positive, as expected.  Interestingly, the set of own and neighbor experience coefficients is consistent with the
hypothesis that neighbors' and own acres are equally valuable in augmenting information (13), as the change
over time in the effects of each type of experience is the same statistically (p=.165). This constraint is
imposed, for efficiency, in the final specification, the estimates from which are reported in the third column.
In this specification, the coefficients on the own and village-level experience variables are both significantly
different from zero. For the HYV-decision rule the estimated ratio of period 2 to period 3 effects,  8 , is ht
.78<1, indicating that the effect of an additional hectare of experience was greater in the third period than in
the second period.
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An additional implication of the equivalence of own and neighbors' experience is that, as indicated in
equation (13), the ratio of the coefficients of own to village average experience (" /" ) should be the same as ot vt
the ratio of the own and village experience ($ /$ ) coefficients obtained from the profit function. The ot vt
estimated ratios are remarkably close - The $ ratio computed from the linearized profit function estimates
(Table 3, column 3), is 1.8 while the ratio of the experience (") coefficients, from the third column of Table
4, is 1.7.  
22
The estimates of the effects of own and neighbors' assets on HYV use also are supportive of the
learning-from-others model, and suggest that learning externalities are not internalized by the village. In
particular, each of the own-asset effects is positive while each of the neighbors'-asset effects is negative. With
the exception of the own-asset effect of irrigation and the neighbors'-asset effect of equipment, the estimated
coefficients are also significantly different from zero at the 5% level or better. Using the average coefficients
for own assets, an increase in 1000 rupees in the stock of assets owned by a farmer yields a .13 hectare
increase in HYV adoption. By contrast an increase of 1000 rupees in the average stock of assets owned by23
neighbors results in a .10 hectare decrease in HYV adoption. While the model does not rule out the
possibility that an increase in own and neighbors' assets increase adoption (i.e., there are increasing returns to
experience), these estimates are clearly inconsistent with a model in which there is coordinated decision-
making on the part of the village--under such circumstances own and village assets should have the same
effect on adoption.  
23
V. Simulations Based on Estimated Parameters and Calibration
The HYV-decision rule and profit-equation estimates can be combined with additional information to
describe the dynamics of profit growth and new-technology adoption implicit in the learning model. They can
also be used to assess the consequences for technology adoption of changes in the distribution of assets. In
particular, they permit an assessment of whether the estimated parameters yield an S-curve for adoption and
whether the existence of learning from others matters for the temporal patterns and profitability of new
technology adoption.
 Although the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 provide most of the information necessary to carry out
dynamic simulations, some additional information is needed. First, it is necessary to make some assumption
about how the level of assets owned by households accumulate over time. This was done by fixing the
savings rate, based on detailed savings data available in 1971, at .204, the ratio of net savings to profits
among cultivator households.  Similarly, gross cropped area (1.9) is based on its 1971 value.
Second, because fixed-effects methods were used to estimate the profit functions and HYV decision
rules, no estimates are available for the constants. These were therefore calibrated along with the initial stock
of assets by selecting values, given the parameters estimates from Tables 3 and 4 and the assumed savings
rate and land area, that matched, in the third year of the simulation, actual average values of the levels of
assets, profits and HYV use among cultivators in the HYV-using villages in 1971.   The constants selected
24
were as follows--the constants in the profit and HYV equations were computed to be 1428 and -.166,24
respectively, and the initial stock of assets was found to be 1561 Rs.
25
One final problem for simulation arises from the implication of the model that the effects of
experience are not necessarily constant over time and we estimate parameters pertaining to only two periods. 
Diminishing returns to experience in profitability is an implication of the model and was confirmed by the
profit-function estimates. However, that we directly estimated the structure of the profit function implies that
the relationship between experience and profitability can be computed at any point in time. This is clearly not
the case for the decision rule where the complex nature of the problem precludes direct estimation of the
structural parameters. The coefficients for the adoption equation are thus specific to the second and third
years of adoption experience. In order to predict adoption in the fourth or fifth the year of the program,
therefore, some plausible rule must be used to select the appropriate coefficients.  
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Fortunately, and in contrast to the linear estimates of the profit function, it does not appear  that the
experience coefficient in the adoption decision equation in the relevant period is changing very much. The
estimate of 8  of .78 reported in Table 4 for years two and three is not significantly different from one at ht
conventional levels (p=.21). Assuming that this relationship continues after the second and third year, it is
possible to compute experience coefficients for subsequent years by dividing by this estimated ratio.  Thus,
for the purposes of the simulation we assumed that " =" /8 and " =" /8 for the own and village effects of ot o0 vt v0
tt
information, respectively, on HYV use in period t.   We also imposed the constraints that HYVs acreage
27
should not fall below zero and should not exceed the point at which land is sufficiently unsuited to HYV that,
even under perfect information about 2 , the traditional varieties would be more profitable at the margin than
*
would high yielding varieties.  
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The importance of learning and learning-spillover effects for the profitability of HYVs are illustrated
in Figure 1, which plots, for different rates of experimentation, the growth in HYV profits per hectare relative
to traditional-variety profitability on land that is well suited to new varieties. The dotted line shows profit
growth when a constant amount of HYV (.1 hectares per period) is grown each period. This shows the25
diminishing returns to learning in terms of per-hectare profitability. In particular, during the initial period
when farmers have no experience with the new varieties, per hectare profits are actually negative (-829 Rs).
The first .1 hectares of experience raises the profitability 1014 Rs so that HYVs yield positive profits in the
second period, although profitability is less than that of traditional varieties (1136 Rs). The increment to
profitability for the second period is only 543 Rs, however, and between the fifth and sixth periods profits
increase by only 168 Rs, although by this point HYVs yield higher profits than do traditional varieties.
By contrast when the rate of planting changes optimally with experience, given the estimated
adoption rates of the model, profitability increases dramatically between the third and fourth years. Even if
only the profitability effects of own experience  are considered, profits increase by 667 Rs between periods 2
29
and 3 and by 1185 Rs between periods 3 and 4. Profitability increases even more rapidly when both own and
neighbors’ experience effects are allowed to affect learning - HYVs become more profitable than traditional
varieties almost a year earlier than they do when only own experience affects learning.
To assess the relative importance of  own and neighbor learning effects on the temporal patterns of
adoption, simulations were performed for farmers and their neighbors differentiated by their initial asset
stocks.  The simulation results for adoption are presented in Figure 2 for four cases: poor farmers with poor
30
and rich neighbors and rich farmers with poor and rich neighbors.  A “poor” farmer (neighbor) is assumed to
have an initial asset stock  200 Rs (13%) less than the average calibrated value (1561 Rs) and a “rich” farmer
or neighbor  is assumed to have an initial asset stock is 200 Rs above the calibrated average value.  There are
a number of striking features of the adoption plots. First, they all follow closely the "S" curve that is generally
thought to characterize adoption. In this case, the adoption trajectories reflect the accumulation of experience
and the absence of declines in the effects of experience on adoption. Consider, for example, the adoption
curve of a poor farmer with poor neighbors. In the first period he plants no HYVs while in the second period,
there is a small increase to .036 hectares.  Over the next two periods, the amount planted to HYVs increases
by .137 and .441 hectares respectively. By the fifth period all land suitable to the cultivation of HYVs is26
planted to these varieties and there is no subsequent increase in adoption.
The simulations also indicate that the rate of adoption is importantly influenced by the production
wealth (operation scale) of a farmer and his neighbors. In particular, holding constant the wealth of a farmer’s
neighbors, a difference in 400 Rs (29%) in a farmer’s initial asset stock results in a more than three-fold
increase in adoption by the third year.  Consistent with the finding that wealthier farmers adopt more rapidly
and that learning externalities are not internalized in the village, the simulations also indicate that poor
farmers with wealthy neighbors are slower to adopt than are those with poor neighbors. In particular, the
simulations suggest that a farmer whose average neighbor has an initial asset stock of 1761 Rs does not
adopt at all until the third year, although he catches up quite rapidly after that. This catch-up reflects the fact
that a farmer who is able to initially rely on his neighbors to undertake experimentation when it is costly
(because little experience has been accumulated) will be subsequently wealthier on average then a farmer who
has to rely on his own experimentation.
The simulation results indicate that overall gains to profits associated with the adoption of high-
yielding varieties, which depend on both profitability per hectare and the amount of the crop that is adopted,
are modest, given the evident initial losses that must be sustained in order to benefit from the new
technologies.  The simulations in Figures 1 and 2 indicate that a poor farmer with poor neighbors experiences
cumulative profits over an 8-year period following the introduction of the new varieties that are only 7.4%
higher than those he would have earned staying with traditional varieties. If the poor farmer has wealthier
neighbors so that own experimentation can be reduced, however, the relative increase in profits from adopting
the new varieties rises to 9.6%.  The effects are comparable for the better-off farmers.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we have used a model that incorporates learning by doing and learning spillovers to
derive implications for the adoption and profitability of new technologies. Household-level panel data from a
nationally representative sample of rural India have then been used to test the main implications of the model27
as well as to assess the magnitudes of learning spillovers, the extent to which potential learning externalities
are internalized, and the implications of these effects for the level and distribution of benefits associated with
new technologies. 
The primary conclusions of the paper are as follows. First, the estimates indicate that imperfect
knowledge about how to use new varieties is a significant barrier to the adoption of these varieties. The fact
that own and neighbors' experience influence profitability net of the adoption of HYVs in addition to
affecting the rates of adoption suggests that experience effects operate, at least in part, by augmenting the
ability of farmers to make appropriate decisions about input use for the new technologies. The rapid decline
over time in the effects of experience on profitability indicates, however, that the importance of this barrier
substantially diminishes in the first few years of use as experience increases. 
Second, we find evidence of learning spillovers. We find that farmers with experienced neighbors are
significantly more profitable than those with inexperienced neighbors and, consistent with this result, that the
former are likely to devote more of their land to the new technologies. The magnitudes of the effects indicate
that a given increase in average experience by a farmer's neighbors increases profitability by almost twice as
much as the same increase in own experience. The fact that the effects of own and neighbors experience on
profitability decrease at the same rate between adjacent periods, as predicted by the model, provides further
support for the notion that village experience, as with own experience, operate through its effect on
knowledge about the correct management of the new varieties.
Third, the estimates indicate that the spillover effects associated with learning from others are small
but not unimportant. In terms of adoption, the estimates indicate that a 29% increase in own initial assets
advances the rate of adoption by about a year and that this results in a somewhat smaller reduction in the rate
of adoption on the part of neighbors, who curtail their own costly experimentation. The effects of neighbors’
experimentation on the profitability of HYVs is also significant, resulting in a decrease by about a year in the
time at which the profitability of HYVs exceeds that of traditional varieties. The overall effects indicate that28
total profits over an 8-year period following the introduction of HYVs are 2 percentage points higher when
one has neighbors with 29% higher initial assets.
The finding that net of own and neighbors' experience, own and neighbors' assets have opposite
effects on adoption indicates that farmers tend to free-ride on the learning of others. Given that optimal
learning requires that the marginal profitability of HYVs relative to the traditional crop be negative, a farmer
can reduce his losses in a given period if he can rely on his neighbors to gain the relevant experience and then
increase his use of  the new technology as it becomes more profitable. These results suggest that information
on the management of HYVs within the village is not excludable: if  information gained by one farmer could
be kept from other farmers, then a market for information could arise that compensated farmers for
experimentation that benefitted other farmers.  The results also indicate that there is not sufficient
31
coordination of HYV adoption within the village to generate levels of learning that are socially efficient.
Thus, these results provide some support for public efforts to increase adoption through subsidies to early
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Effects of Experience on HYV Profits with Village-Level Shocks
Let
so that the posterior variance presented in equation (8) is 
It follows that:
and
Note that f’(z)<0 and f”(z)<0. Thus (22) and (23) are both positive and their ratio is D /D . Assuming ov
H $ H $ H >0 for all j and thus F <F , implies  . Thus the own and neighbor jt+1 jt jt-1 2jt+1 2jt












































































Comparative Statics for HYV-Decision Rule in Period T-1
In order to construct comparative statics for period T-1, we first solve the problem as of period T. At
that point, since there are no returns to additional learning and thus, assuming an interior solution, each
farmer sets the differential profitability of HYV to zero, giving   and
 where the precision of information for j at time t is denoted
.  Also, let   and
. 
Differentiating the value function at time T-1 for farmer j and each of his n neighbors with respect to
their respective HYV use in period T-1 yields n+1 first order conditions that must jointly hold. Define
matrices M  where   , M  where   and M  where HS A
 for all j and j* over the range [1,n+1]. Inverting -M  and multiplying by M  and M HS A
yields expressions for the effects of own assets and experience on HYV adoption in period T-1 as well as the
effects of the assets and experience of an arbitrary neighbor. Multiplying the latter by the number of




























































































We assume that interior solutions obtain in each period and restrict attention to equilibria that are stable.
Second order conditions imply that   and thus, since neighbors' experience is no more efficient
than own experience D /nD #1,  . Local stability of the equilibrium in period T-1 vo
requires D>0 and thus it may be shown that  ,   , and
.  Also, V >0. These conditions are sufficient to establish that own and SA
neighbor effects of experience on adoption as well as the own effect of assets on adoption are positive. The
sign of the effect of neighbors' assets on experience is determined by the sign of V : if there are increasing SS
returns to experience (V >0) then an increase in neighbors' assets will increase adoption, while the opposite SS

















former effect is likely to be present if experience is low while the latter is likely if experience is high.
The ratio of neighbors' to own experience effects may be written
In the special case that information from neighbors is equivalent to own information,  D =nD , the estimated  vo
ratio of neighbors' to own experience effects is D /D =n. A similar result obtains if V =0. On the other hand, vo S S
if neighbors' information is imperfect as assumed and V <0 (V >0) the resulting ratio should be less than SS SS
(greater than) D /D . vo33
References
Bahk, Byong-Hyong and Michael Gort "Decomposing Learning by Doing in New Plants", Journal of
Political Economy, 101 (August 1993): 561-583.
Besley, Timothy and Anne Case "Modeling Technology Adoption in Developing Countries", American
Economic Review, 83 (May 1993): 396-402.
Besley, Timothy and Anne Case "Diffusion as a Learning Process: Evidence from HYV Cotton", Manuscript,
Princeton: Princeton University, Department of Economics, 1994.
Case, Anne "Spatial Patterns in Household Demand", Econometrica, 59 (July 1991): 953-966.
Evans, William N., Wallace E. Oates, Robert Schwab "Measuring Peer Group Effects:  a Study of Teenage
Behavior", Journal of Political Economy, 100 (October 1992): 966-991.
Feder, Gershon, Richard E. Just, and David Zilberman "Adoption of Agricultural Innovations in Developing
Countries: a Survey", Economic Development and Cultural Change , 33 (January 1985):255-98.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole  Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
Jovanovic, Boyan and Yaw Nyarko "The Bayesian Foundation of Learning by Doing", Manuscript, New York:
New York University, Department of Economics, 1994. 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. "Making a Miracle" Econometrica, 61(March 1993): 251-72.
Romer, Paul M.  "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth", Journal of Political Economy, 94 (October
1986):1002-37.
Romer, Paul M. "Are Nonconvexities Important for Understanding Growth?"  American Economic Review 80
(May 1990): 97-103.
Wilson, Robert "Information Economies of Scale", Bell Journal of Economics 1 (Spring 1975): 184-95.Table 1
Information Sources of Farmers in Three Surveys
India (ARIS) India (REDS) Philippines (Bukidnon)
ab c
Source cropping  practices
Source of information Source of information Most important source
about fertilizer use about fertilizer use of information about
de
f
Friends and neighbors  30.4 42.5 41.6
Government agency 51.4 62.9 NA
Local extension agent NA 35.4 0
Demonstration projects 3.2 NA 50.0
 NCAER Additional Rural Income Survey, 1970-71 (national): 1,970 farmers, population-weighted
a
counts.
 NCAER Rural Economic Development Survey, 1981-82 (national): 186 villages with HYV use.
b
 IFPRI Bukidnon Survey, 1986: 12 corn farmers using HYV seeds.
c
 Percentage reporting source among seventeen mutually-exclusive categories.
d
 Percentage reporting source among seven non-exclusive categories.
e
 Percentage reporting source among eight mutually-exclusive categories.
fTable 2
Cross-sectional and Panel Estimates of Profit Function for Farmers Not Using HYVs
a
Estimation Method OLS Fixed-Effects IV Fixed-effects IV Fixed-effects
Village Experience .137 -.187 -.246 -.240
(1.84) (.654) (.804) (.784)
b
Initial Period Village .166
      Experience (.514)  
Equipment .085 .597 2.94 2.90
(1.29) (2.11) (2.90) (2.85)
Irrigation Assets .162 .050 .425 .440
(7.68) (.691) (2.00) (2.06)
Animals .657 -.377 -1.74 -1.76
(17.9) (2.30) (4.16) (4.20)
Prim. Schooling (x10 ) 1.77 -- -- --
2
(2.01)
Irrigated land .018 -- -- --
(7.01)
Unirrigated Land  .032 -- -- --
(9.34)
House .026 -- -- --
(3.41)
N 1536 1277 1277 1277
 All variables treated as endogenous for IV-Fixed Effect estimates. Instruments include inherited assets, lagged asset
a
flows, lagged profits, lagged village HYV use, and weighted averages of these variables by village.
 Absolute asymptotic t-ratios derived from Huber standard errors in parentheses.
bTable 3
Determinants of Farm Profits from HYV Use
a
Linear Approximation Structural Estimates
                                                                                                                                               
   
Estimation Procedure: FE-IV FE-IV Constrained FE-IV Non-linear FE-IV
HYV effects 




     $ (x10 ) .754 1.05 -- -- ot-1 
5
(2.47) (2.18)
     $ (x10 ) -- .349 .341 -- vt 
5
(2.16) (2.63)
     $ (x10 ) -- 1.93 -- t-1 
5
(2.64)
     8 -- -- 4.33 -- pt
(10.6)
     D  (x10 ) -- -- -- 1.29 o
-3
(3.31)
     D  (x10 ) -- -- -- 3.46 v
-3
(1.33)
     D (x10 ) -- -- -- .298
-3
(6.23)
     0  (x10 ) -- -- -- -.290 ha
4
(3.24)
     0 -F  (x10 ) -- -- -- .139 hu
24
(0.77)
     0 '(x10 ) -.206 -.545 -.344 -- h
4
(1.17) (2.50) (1.73)
     0 (x10 ) .276 .434 .298 .610 he 
4
(1.22) (1.91) (1.34) (3.54)
Farm Equipment 2.25 2.64 2.55 1.67
(2.98) (2.59) (2.68) (2.73)
Farm Animals .641 .813 .543 .189
(.57) (0.68) (0.49) (.207)
Irrigation Assets -1.06 -1.17 -.693 -1.40
(2.39) (2.41) (1.39) (3.35)
N 450 450 450 450
 See text for definitions of parameters.  HYV use is measured in hectares and asset values are in Rupees.All variables
a  
except education and IADP are treated as endogenous. Instruments include inherited assets, lagged asset flows, lagged
profits, lagged village HYV use, and weighted averages of these variables by village.
 Absolute asymptotic t-ratios derived from Huber standard errors in parentheses.
bTable 4
Determinants of HYV Use
a
Estimation Procedure: FE-IV FE-IV Constrained FE-IV
" .975 .791 .600 ot 
(4.48) (3.16) (2.54)
b
" .810 .691 -- ot-1
(2.60) (2.39)
" -- .715 1.04 vt 
(1.60) (1.70)
" -- .450 -- t-1
(0.66)
8 -- -- .780 ht
(4.38)
Farm Equipment-own (x10 ) 4.26 3.11 2.90
-4
(2.05) (2.08) (2.08)
Farm Animals--own  (x10 ) 1.81 .687 .695
-4
(4.57) (2.58) (2.53)
Irrigation Assets--own  (x10 ) .0681 .235 .240
-4
(.88) (1.73) (1.68)
Farm Equipment--neighbor  (x10 ) -- -.0878 -.0194
-4
(0.34) (0.06)
Farm Animals--neighbor  (x10 ) -- -.995 -.948
-4
(2.08) (1.85)
Irrigation Assets--neighbor  (x10 ) -- -2.12 -2.07
-4
(3.58) (3.38)
Trend (x10 ) 3.85 4.04 4.07
-2
(2.54) (2.65) (2.53)
N 2716 2716 2716
 See text for definitions of parameters.  HYV use is measured in hectares and asset values are in  Rupees.All
a  
variables except education, IADP, and trend treated as endogenous. Instruments include inherited assets, lagged asset
flows, lagged profits, lagged village HYV use, and weighted averages of these variables by village.






























Constant Planting Variable Planting with Spillovers
Variable Planting, w/o Spillovers Traditional Varieties
Figure 1:  Predicted  Effects of Learning on Per-HectareProfitability 
































Poor with Poor Neighbors Poor with Rich Neighbors
Rich with Poor Neighbors Rich with Rich Neighbors
Figure 2:  Predicted HYV Adoption  under Various Assumptions 








2’ˆ 2jt&p/2 ˆ 2jt
ˆ 2jt
 These answers do not indicate the importance of the information for either profitability or behavior.
1
 Indeed, experimental plot data describing seed yields for wheat in Uttar Pradesh, India presented in Bliss
2
and Stern (1988) suggest that the relationship between fertilizer use and output per acre conforms closely to a
quadratic for both traditional and high-yielding varieties. These data also show that HYV output is
considerably more sensitive than is traditional output to fertilizer use and that optimal fertilizer use for HYV
exceeds that for traditional seeds.
 Jovanovic and Nyarko (1994) considers a menu of technologies, but this generalization is not relevant to the
3
setting we study.
 We introduce variation in the suitability of land to the adoption of HYVs in order to ensure an interior
4
solution for the HYV decision rules.  
 It may be shown that  . Note also that for notational convenience we
5
use a continuous approximation to write the quadratic HYV term as 0 H /2A rather than 0 (H +1)H /2A. ha jt j ha jt jt j
22
With a suitably small choice for area units the error associated with this approximation falls to zero. 
We have assumed for simplicity that the input is costless. If the input price were p, then the  ex ante optimal
6
 and profits would include additional terms in  . The exclusion of p has no consequences for the
implications derived from the profit function relations in (3), derived below, but would complicate the
decision rules for H. This is because an individual with a history of shocks signaling low expected target use
will anticipate a higher return to HYVs than an otherwise identical individual whose experience suggests high
target use. Although incorporating this effect would substantially complicate the theory, because   follows a
random walk it would have only minor implications for the empirical implementation given our use of fixed-
effects methods.
Note that the information generated by a parcel sown to HYV is independent of the input decision. This
7
Footnotes
*The research in this paper is supported in part from grants NIH, HD30907, and NSF, SBR93-08405. We















implies that there is no return to input experimentation; i.e., conscious variation across plots in a given year in
input use. This assumption simplifies the input decision, which depends only on current expected profits and
the information structure. 
Note that since each neighboring farmer's choice of the ex ante optimal input reflects that farmer's history of
8
target realizations, the set of these actual neighbor inputs are sufficient statistics to farmer j for his neighbor's
prior experience and could be used instead of the full history.
We exclude the possibility that farmers tend to forget experience over time. 
9
Note that the value of D  depends on both the number of neighbors and the relative precision of information
10
v
obtained from their experience; however one cannot distinguish a situation of many neighbors with imprecise
information from one of few neighbors with precise information using estimates of the profit function. 
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). The key feature of a  Markov perfect equilibrium is that choices can only
11
depend on past behaviors to the extent that these behaviors influence the potential payoffs and/or choice sets
of the players. Thus the only variables summarizing the history of play that influence the value function at
time t are S  and S  because past HYV use only affects payoffs through its effects on the subjective jt -jt
distribution of 2* for each farmer. Note that this solution concept effectively rules out the use of multi-period
penalties that could in principle be used to support efficient HYV decision-making from the perspective of
the community. Besley and Case (1994) also use this solution concept.  
It may be shown that 
12
Note that for small (large) S  the returns to experience are increasing (decreasing) in experience. Although jT
greater experience decreases the returns to future experience given the choice of HYV area it also increases
the return to planting HYVs in that period which, in turn, raises the returns to experience.  
In these villages 80% of the cultivators were growing either wheat or rice. 
13The 1968-69 crop year was marked by extremely poor weather. This evidently had an effect on the
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following year's planting decisions. The possibility of prior weather shocks influencing HYV choice, although
not explicitly modeled, is taken into account by the estimation procedure we use, as described below.
Note that equation (15) and the linear approximation derived from it (equations 16) assume i.i.d. shocks.
15
Incorporation of village-level common shocks (equation 8) would require that separate coefficients in the
linear approximation appear on each of the components of S , that is H ...H .In principle this result might jt j1 jt-1 .
be used to distinguish the two models. However, with only three years of HYV data and thus only two years
over which experience effects can be estimated, the two models cannot be distinguished using linear methods.
The reason is that the differenced linear approximation given village-level shocks that is analogous to
equation (16) has essentially the same specification: i.e., it includes cumulative own and neighbors’s
experience for each of the previous two years and yields the same predictions with regard to the ratios of
these coefficients.
 In addition, the existence of borrowing constraints creates a correlation between contemporaneous HYV
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decisions and past input and weather shocks. Moreover, if capital accumulation is allowed and is also credit-
constrained, then A  and ),  will also be correlated.  jt+1 pjt
We exclude the use of H  as an instrument because some component of the profit shock (e.g., the timing of
17
jt
the monsoon) may be known at the time that H  is chosen. jt
All of these farmers grew wheat or rice in the 1970-71 crop year, for which we have crop data. 70% of these
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grew wheat with almost half of the wheat-growing farmers also growing rice. The data do not provide crop-
specific profit and input information. 
As a result of differences in agro-climatic conditions, there was substantial variability across India in the
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suitability of HYVs during the initial stages of the green revolution. Because our model implies that HYVs
will only be used when, under optimal use, they are more profitable than traditional varieties, we limit our
analysis to villages in which at least one household used HYVs in the third year of the study (1970-71). There
are thus 101 of the 250 villages included in our analyses. Village-level variables reflect the characteristics ofall cultivating households, whether or not they use HYVs. 
The other estimated profit function parameters are well-behaved - the coefficient on the parameter estimate
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that captures the diminishing suitability to HYV adoption of land, 0 , is negative and significant, as ha
expected, while that for the level coefficient, 0 , is positive. h 
While, as noted, the model does not yield strong predictions about the magnitude of 8 , some insight into
21
ht
the implications of this figure may be gained by noting that if adoption were proportional to experience (8 =1 ht
and no constant term) then HYV-acreage would exhibit exponential growth. The fact that this coefficient
increases over time suggests that growth will be more than exponential in the initial stages of adoption.
  As discussed in the appendix, however, the fact that this ratio is somewhat less than that observed for
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profits is also consistent with a model with imperfect information in which there are diminishing returns to
experience. In either case, the similarity of these results provides good support for the central premise of the
model, that own and village experience affect HYVs only through their effect on current and future
profitability.  If, for example, adoption decisions were driven by rules of thumb or peer-group effects then one
might expect a much greater effect of village relative to own experience on adoption than on profitability. 
This interpretation of the results assumes that the social planner can reallocate variable assets across land in
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the same village. A more restricted model planner would allow these assets to be used only on the land owned
by the farmer in question. Under these circumstances own and neighbors’ assets may have different effects on
the level of HYV acreage by differentially affecting gross cropped area for the different farmers. The effect of
an increase in own and neighbors’ assets on the share of gross cropped area allocated to HYVs should
nonetheless be the same for all farmers in the same village. Thus, HYV decision rules using the share of area
devoted to HYVs as the LHS variable were also estimated.  The hypothesis of equal own and neighbor effects
was also rejected under this specification  (P=.011), with the own and neighbors’ asset effects having
opposite signs for each asset.
Assuming that the HYVs first became available in the 1968-69 crop year, the figures in 1971 reflect the
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third year of experience. In addition to providing a systematic way of selecting these constants, benchmarkingusing the figures from the data is important because the linear approximations of the decision rule may yield
inaccurate predictions if they are used to extrapolate well beyond the range of the data used for estimation.
1971 figures was used rather than, for example, 1968, because information on asset stocks was only available
in 1971 and because, as the final period of  the data, the use of  the 1971 data minimizes the extent of
extrapolation used in computing HYV usage for subsequent years. 
This figure reflects only variable assets. Assets that are fixed over time enter, in effect, through the constant
25
in the profit equation. 
Coefficients on experience for the first year are also not available in Table 4, but this presents no problem
26
because experience with HYVs is taken to be zero in that period. 
An alternate approach is to use the fact that 8  is not significantly different from one to assert that the
27
ht
effects of experience on adoption remain constant. This change has little effect on the results presented below
and thus we only present the simulations for 8 =.78.  ht
This latter figure is determined by (0 +0  ed)/(20 ) where ed is the proportion with primary schooling and
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hh e h a
A is gross cultivated area.
These simulations refer to an uneducated farmer with an initial asset stock of 1561 Rs.
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The simulations are carried out assuming that the farmer has no primary schooling, as is the case for the
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majority of farmers. Simulations assuming that the farmer has primary schooling yield broadly similar results,
the main difference being that the initial profits associated with adoption on the most suitable acreage are
positive in that case. 
The resulting market would not, in general, yield efficient outcomes because, in the context of our model,
31
information on HYV use is nonrival as well as nonexcludable.  See, Romer (1990) for a discussion of this
distinction.